Let I = {i 1 , . . . , i n } be a set of voters (players) and A = {a 1 , . . . , a p } be a set of candidates (outcomes). Each voter i ∈ I has a preference P i over the candidates. We assume that P i is a complete order on A. The preference profile P = {P i , i ∈ I} is called a situation. A situation is called war if the set of all voters I is partitioned in two coalitions K 1 and K 2 such that all voters of K i have the same preference, i = 1, 2, and these two preferences are opposite. For a simple class of veto voting schemes we prove that the results of elections in all war situations uniquely define the results for all other (peace) situations. In other words, the results depend only on the veto (or effectivity) function. We give several other examples from game (and from graph) theory with the same property.
Main Theorem
We follow standard concepts and notation of veto voting theory; see, e.g., [5] , [6] Chapter 6, and [8] section 8.4 . Let I = {i 1 , . . . , i n } be a set of voters (players) and A = {a 1 , . . . , a p } be a set of candidates (outcomes). Each voter i ∈ I has a preference (a complete order) P i over all candidates. The set of all preferences P = {P i , i ∈ I} is called a preference profile or a situation. A situation is called war if the set of voters I is partitioned in two coalitions K 1 and K 2 such that all voters of K i have the same preference, i = 1, 2, and these two preferences are opposite. All other situations we will call peace.
Further, each voter i ∈ I has µ i veto cards and each candidate a ∈ A has λ a counter-veto cards. Positive integers µ i and λ a are called the veto power of i ∈ I and veto resistance of a ∈ A, respectively. The corresponding integral-valued functions. µ : I → Z Z + and λ : I → Z Z + are called veto power and veto resistance distributions.
Let us define the veto order σ µ as a word in the alphabet I = {i 1 , . . . , i n } in which every letter i ∈ I appears exactly µ i times and hence each word σ µ has the same length i∈I µ i . The triplet (λ, µ, σ µ ) is called veto voting scheme (VVS). It is realized as follows. In the given order σ µ the voters put their veto cards against the candidates until all veto cards are finished. The voters have complete information. It is forbidden to over-veto; that is as soon as a candidate a has got λ a veto cards (s)he is eliminated and no more veto cards can be used against a. All non-eliminated candidates are elected. Obviously, this set will be empty unless total veto power is strictly less than total veto resistance; that is i∈I µ i < a∈A λ a (1.1)
If we assume further that a∈A λ a − i∈I µ i = 1.
(1.2) then exactly one candidate is elected in each situation. However, unlike (1.1), this assumption is not mandatory.
Remark 1. Though majority voting procedures are much more common in the real-life committees than voting by veto, yet, the latter too has its pluses and proponents. "Thus, the [veto voting] procedure establishes incentives to make proposals that, although perhaps favouring oneself, stand relatively high in the other voters' preferences" [8] , p.175.
"Application of veto voting will lop off the proposals lying farthest from the center of the density function defined over all optima, leaving as possible winners only a subset of proposals clustered around the center" [8] , p.179.
"The essential instability implied by the majority principle results from the very sharp underlying distribution of power: any coalition has either full or zero power. In particular, a 49% minority can be exploited to death by the opposing 51% majority. To avoid this instability, we use a more flexible allocation of coalitional power where a coalition K can block up to v(K) outcomes" [6] , p.119.
Let us also point out certain similarity between veto voting schemes and the well-known Colonel Blotto's games, see, e.g., [9] , where the divisions play role of the veto cards and counter-veto cards.
In general, the analysis of a given voting scheme is a problem of game theory, since the voters may behave in many different, sometimes rather sophisticated, ways. However, in this paper we consider only the simplest concept of their sincere behavior. This means that each voter i ∈ I always puts each veto card against the worst (with respect to the preference P i ) not yet eliminated candidate. Hence, given a VVS (λ, µ, σ µ ), a set of elected candidates B = B(P ) ⊆ A is uniquely defined for every situation P = {P i , i ∈ I}. In fact, the voting scheme introduced above is not even implemented by a game. Indeed, given P , the behavior of each voter is prescribed uniquely; that is (s)he has only one strategy.
In general, a mapping S : P → 2 A which assigns a set of candidates to every preference profile is called a social choice correspondence (SCC), and it is called a social choice function (SCF) if only one candidate is elected; that is |S(P )| = 1 for each situation P . Thus, every veto voting scheme (λ, µ, σ µ ) defines a SCC S λ,µ,σµ which is an SCF whenever (1.2) holds. The SCC or SCF generated by a veto voting scheme are called veto SCC and SCF, respectively.
A veto order σ µ is called simple if the voters do not alternate, or more precisely, if there exists a permutation τ of I such that first the voter τ −1 (i 1 ) put all veto cards, followed by τ −1 (i 2 ), etc. Obviously, a simple veto order σ µ is uniquely determined by µ and τ . The corresponding veto voting scheme and SCC we will call simple and denote by (λ, µ, τ ) and S λ,µ,τ , respectively.
In this paper we prove that each simple veto SCC is uniquely defined by the values it takes in the war situations. More precisely, the following statement holds. Theorem 1. Given two simple veto voting schemes V V S ′ = (λ ′ , µ ′ , τ ) and V V S ′′ = (λ ′′ , µ ′′ , τ ) that generate social choice correspondences S ′ = S λ ′ ,µ ′ ,τ (P ) and S ′′ = S λ ′′ ,µ ′′ ,τ (P ), respectively, if S ′ (P ) = S ′′ (P ) for each war situation P then S ′ (P ) = S ′′ (P ) for all P .
Note, however, that we do not promote Theorem 1 to the rank of a general law of diplomacy. For example, it is not general enough just because it only holds when the two involved veto orders coincide, moreover, it must be a simple order; otherwise the claim may fail, see Example 1 below.
Further, let us remark that in a war situation the veto order (simple or not) does not matter at all. In this case all candidates are uniquely ordered and all voters are split in two coalitions that veto candidates from two opposite ends of this order. Some moderate (centrist) candidates will be elected and the set of these candidates does not depend on the order in which the voters act. More accurately these arguments are summarized as follows. Lemma 1. Given distributions λ, µ and two veto orders σ ′ µ , σ ′′ µ , the equality S λ,µ,σ ′ µ (P ) = S λ,µ,σ ′′ µ (P ) holds for each war situation P . Yet, for the other, peace, situations the result of elections may depend on the veto order. Example 1. Let us consider two voters of veto power 3 and 1 and three candidates of veto resistance 1,2, and 2; that is I = {i 1 , i 2 }, A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }, µ 1 = 3, µ 2 = 1, λ 1 = 1, λ 2 = λ 3 = 2. Note that (1.2) holds and hence this voting scheme generates an SCF. Let the preferences be a 1 > a 2 > a 3 and a 2 > a 1 > a 3 for i 1 and i 2 respectively. This profile defines a peace situation P .
First, let us consider two simple veto orders i 1 , i 1 , i 1 , i 2 and i 2 , i 1 , i 1 , i 1 . If i 1 votes first then (s)he eliminates a 3 and puts one remaining veto card against a 2 . Still a 2 is not eliminated, yet. Moreover, a 2 will be elected, since i 2 vetoes a 1 . If i 2 votes first (s)he puts the veto card against a 3 . This allows i 1 to eliminate both a 3 and a 2 . Hence, in this case a 1 is elected. Now let us consider two veto orders i 1 , i 1 , i 2 , i 1 and i 1 , i 2 , i 1 , i 1 . These orders are not simple and they have similar pattern: first i 1 , then i 2 , then i 1 again. However, these two orders result in electing different candidates. In the first case i 1 eliminates a 3 , then i 2 eliminates a 1 , and a 2 is elected. In the second case i 1 puts just one veto card against a 3 , then i 2 eliminates a 3 , and now i 1 can eliminate a 2 by the two remaining veto cards, hence, a 1 is elected.
Finally, let us remark that, according to Lemma 1, all four veto orders considered above would give the same result in each war situation.
An equivalent statement
The theorem can be equivalently reformulated as follows.
The veto function is defined as a mapping V : 
In other words, K can veto B if the voters from K have sufficiently many veto-cards to eliminate all candidates from B. Now we can reformulate Theorem 1 in terms of veto functions as follows.
be two simple veto voting schemes such that they have the same simple veto order τ and their veto functions
Then the SCCs S ′ = S µ ′ ,λ ′ ,τ and S ′′ = S µ ′′ ,λ ′′ ,τ are equal, too; that is S ′ (P ) = S ′′ (P ) for every situation P .
To prove that Theorems 1 and 2 are equivalent we only need to show that Theorem 2 becomes trivial if we restrict ourselves to the war situations only. In other words, given a veto function, the results of elections in all war situations are uniquely defined, and vice versa. Due to Lemma 1, this is true for all (not only simple) veto orders.
Lemma 2. Given two veto voting schemes
µ ′′ , the following claims are equivalent:
Consider a complete order P 0 over A such that each candidate from A \ B is preferred to each candidate from B. Let a 0 be the best candidate from B in this order. Define a war situation P as follows. All voters from K prefer candidates according to P 0 (that is for them A \ B is better than B) and all voters from I \ K have the opposite preference. Then obviously, a 0 ∈ S ′ (P ), since V ′ (K, B) = 1 and in V V S ′ coalition K can veto the whole block B including a 0 . Yet, a 0 ∈ S ′′ (P ), since V ′′ (K, B) = 0; that is in V V S ′′ coalition K does not have enough veto power to eliminate B and hence a 0 will remain unvetoed. Thus S ′ (P ) = S ′′ (P ).
Vice versa, suppose that S ′ (P ) = S ′′ (P ) for a war situation P defined by a complete order P 0 over A and a partition K, I \ K. Without loss of generality, we can assume that a 0 ∈ S ′′ (P ) \ S ′ (P ); that is a 0 ∈ S ′ (P ) and a 0 ∈ S ′′ (P ). Let B consist of a 0 and all candidates preceding a 0 in order P 0 . Then obviously, V ′ (K, B) = 1, otherwise a 0 would be elected in V V S ′ , and V ′′ (K, B) = 0, otherwise a 0 would be vetoed in V V S ′′ .
Proof of Theorem 2
In this section we will consider only simple veto orders. Then, without any loss of generality, we can assume that permutation τ is identical; that is first i 1 distributes all veto cards, then i 2 , etc. In this case argument τ becomes irrelevant and we will omit it in all formulas. In particular, pair (λ, µ) already defines a voting scheme.
We will make use of the terminology from the popular game Sea Battle; see, for example, http:/www.karpolan.com/sea-battle. Given a scheme (λ, µ), a voter i ∈ I, and a candidate a ∈ A, we say that a is killed (or eliminated) by i if a is not elected and the last veto card put against a belongs to i; we say that a is wounded by i if i puts at least one veto card against a but i does not eliminate a, that is, either a is elected or a is eliminated later by some other voter. Proof. . Indeed, if i votes against a then (s)he cannot switch to another candidate a ′ before a is eliminated. This follows from our two basic assumptions: (i) the veto order is simple and (ii) the voting is sincere.
Let us remark that both assumptions are important. For example, if veto order is not simple then i can wound a, then another voter can eliminate a, and then i can vote again and wound some other candidate a ′ .
Given a VVS (λ, µ) and situation P , let us assign to each candidate a a set W (a) of all voters who put at least one veto card against a. We would like to prove (by induction on n = |I|) that W (a) depends only on P and the veto function V (λ, µ). However, problems appear already for n = 1. Given two schemes V V S ′ = (λ ′ , µ ′ ), V V S ′′ = (λ ′′ , µ ′′ ), and P , let us assume, for example, that a 5 , a 3 , and a 4 are the last 3 candidates in the preference order of i 1 . Furthermore, let us assume that in V V S ′ i 1 kills a 5 and a 3 using up all veto cards, while in V V S ′′ i 1 kills a 5 and a 3 and still (s)he has more veto cards to wound (but not enough to kill) a 4 , that is,
Then W ′ (a 4 ) = ∅, while W ′′ (a 4 ) = {i 1 } and yet we get no contradiction, since veto functions V ′ and V ′′ may be equal. It is not difficult to understand that this happens due to the equality µ ′
However, it is possible to get rid of all such equalities. For simplicity let us denote i∈K µ i by µ(K) and a∈B λ a by λ(B) for all K ⊆ I, B ⊆ A. Proof. . Let K 0 = {i} and B 0 = {a}. Furthermore, let K 1 be the set of all voters who wound a. According to Lemma 3, they cannot wound any other candidate, yet, they can kill some. Let B 1 be the set of all such candidates and let K 2 be the set of all voters who wound B 1 . Again, they cannot wound any other candidate, yet, they can eliminate some. Let B 2 be the set of all such candidates, etc. Finally, let K = ∪ ∞ j=0 K j and B = ∪ ∞ j=0 B j . (Obviously, K j and B j become empty when j is large enough.)
By the above construction, the voters of K vote only against candidates of B and all other voters do not vote against B. Hence µ(K) = λ(B) and (λ, µ) is degenerate.
Schemes (λ ′ , µ ′ ) and (λ ′′ , µ ′′ ) are called equivalent if they define the same SCC; that is two sets of elected candidates S λ ′ ,µ ′ (P ) and S λ ′′ ,µ ′′ (P ) coincide for each situation P . In particular, they coincide in all war situations and hence equivalent schemes must define the same veto function, V λ ′ ,µ ′ (K, B) = V λ ′′ ,µ ′′ (K, B) for all pairs K, B
Lemma 5. For each scheme (λ, µ) there exists an equivalent non-degenerate scheme (λ ′ , µ ′ ).
Proof. . Let us multiply vectors λ and µ by a positive integer c and then for each pair (K, B) such that µ(K) = λ(B) choose a voter i ∈ K and add 1 to the corresponding veto power. Obviously, if c is large enough, say c > 2 |I|+|A| , then the obtained scheme (λ ′ , µ ′ ) is non-degenerate and equivalent to (λ, µ).
Proof. of Theorem 2. Let V V S ′ = (λ ′ , µ ′ ) and V V S ′′ = (λ ′′ , µ ′′ ) be two schemes whose veto
We will prove that their SCCs S ′ = S λ ′ ,µ ′ and S ′′ = S λ ′′ ,µ ′′ are equal too. Due to Lemma 5, we may assume without loss of generality that both schemes are non-degenerate. For an arbitrary situation P and candidate a we will prove that W ′ (a) = W ′′ (a).
Let us truncate the list of all voters i 1 , i 2 , . . . by the first n voters and proceed with induction on n. Let n = 1 and W ′ (a) = ∅, while W ′′ (a) = {i 1 }. Let B denote the set of all candidates worse than a in the preference order P i 1 . Then Now let us assume that W ′ n−1 ≡ W ′′ n−1 but W ′ n (a) = W ′′ n (a), say i n ∈ W ′′ n (a) \ W ′ n (a); that is voter i n eliminates candidate a in V V S ′′ but not in V V S ′ . Perhaps, in V V S ′ i n did not even vote against a. Yet, since V V S ′ is non-degenerate, there exists a candidate a ′ killed by i n in V V S ′′ and only wounded by i n in V V S ′ . Now we can repeat, with minor modifications, the proof of Lemma 4. Let K 0 = {i n } and B 0 = {a ′ }. Furthermore, let K 1 be the set of all voters who wound a ′ . According to Lemma 3, they cannot wound any other candidate, yet, they can kill some. Let B 1 be the set of all candidates eliminated by K 1 and let K 2 be the set of all voters who wound B 1 . Again, they cannot wound any other candidate, yet, they can kill some. Let B 2 be the set of all candidates eliminated by K 2 ,... etc. Finally, let K = ∪ ∞ j=0 K j and B = ∪ ∞ j=0 B j . (Again, K j and B j are empty when j is large enough.) Let us also note that all sets K j and B j defined above are the same for both schemes V V S ′ and V V S ′′ by the induction hypothesis. Furthermore, by the above construction, all voters of K, except i n , vote only against candidates of B and all other voters do not vote against B. Hence, K cannot veto B in V V S ′ but can do it in V V S ′′ ; that is 0 = V ′ (K, B) = V ′′ (K, B) = 1. This contradiction proves the Theorem.
4 On properties of game structures and graphs that depend only on the corresponding veto functions.
The main result of this paper states that the SCC of a simple veto voting scheme is uniquely defined by its effectivity (or equivalently, veto) function. The following two results are similar: (i) Nash solvability of a two-person game form g depends only on its effectivity function E g .
(ii) The core of a normal form game (g, u) depends only on its utility function u and effectivity function E g .
The definitions follow. Let standardly I and A be a set of voters (players) and candidates (outcomes) respectively. Let us recall that an effectivity function (EFF) is a mapping E : 2 I × 2 A → {0, 1}; that is E has two arguments: a coalition of voters K ⊆ I and a block of candidates B ⊆ A. Further, E(K, B) = 1 (respectively, E(K, B) = 0) means that K can (respectively, can not) guarantee that a candidate of B will be elected. An EFF E is called maximal (or selfdual) if E(K, B) = 1 if and only if E(I \ K, A \ B) = 0.
Let X i be a set of strategies of a voter i ∈ I. A game form is a mapping g : X → A, where X = i∈I X i . Every game form g defines an EFF E g as follows: for a coalition K ⊆ I and block B ⊆ A the EFF E g (K, B) = 1 if and only if K has a strategy
Obviously, the implication E g (I \ K, A \ B) = 0 whenever E g (K, B) = 1 holds for every g.
The game form g is called tight if the inverse implication, E g (I \ K, A \ B) = 1 whenever E g (K, B) = 0, holds too. In other words, g is tight if and only if its EFF E g is selfdual.
A utility function is a mapping u : I × A → IR, where u(i, a) is interpreted as a profit of the voter i ∈ I in case the candidate a ∈ A is elected. A normal form game is a pair (g, u), where g : X → A and u : I × A → IR, are a utility function and game form, respectively.
A game form g is called Nash-solvable if for every utility function u the corresponding normal form game (g, u) has at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
An old theorem claims that a two-person game form is Nash-solvable if and only if it is tight, that is, the corresponding effectivity function is selfdual, [3, 4] . However, this theorem does not generalize the case of n-person game forms for any n ≥ 3, see [4] . Two such game forms may have the same EFF, while one is Nash-solvable and the other one is not.
Another well-known observation, [7] , claims that the core of a normal form game (g, u) depends only on its utility function u and EFF E g .
Given a candidate a 0 ∈ A, a coalition of voters K ⊆ I, and a utility function u : I × A → IR, let P R(K, a 0 , u) = {a ∈ A | u(i, a) > u(i, a 0 )∀i ∈ K} denote the set of all candidates strictly and unanimously preferred to a 0 by the coalition K. Furthermore, given an EFF E : 2 I × 2 A → {0, 1}, obviously, K rejects a 0 whenever E(K, P R(K, a 0 , u)) = 1, since in this case the coalition K can guarantee to all coalitionists that a candidate strictly better than a 0 will be elected.
Given a normal form game (g, u), its core C(g, u) is defined as the set of all candidates that are not rejected by any coalition K ⊆ I; that is C(g, u) = {a ∈ A | E g (K, P R(K, a, u)) = 0 ∀ K ⊆ I}.
Thus, by definition, the core C(g, u) depends only on u and E g .
It is an interesting general question: which properties of game structures depend only on their effectivity (or equivalently, veto) function.
Somewhat surprisingly, a similar situation may hold not only for game structures or voting schemes but also for quite different objects, e.g., for graphs. It was shown in [1] that some important properties of graphs are uniquely determined by the corresponding effectivity functions.
Given a graph G = (V, E), we define its EFF E G as follows. Let us assign a voter i ∈ I to each maximal clique of G and a candidate a ∈ A to each maximal independent set of G. By this, a coalition K v ⊆ I and a block B v ⊆ A is assigned to every vertex v ∈ V . Namely, K v (respectively, B v ) consist of all maximal cliques (respectively, independent sets) of G that contain v. Then the EFF E G is defined as follows: E G (K, B) = 1 if K v ⊆ K and B v ⊆ B for some vertex v ∈ V and E G (K, B) = 0 otherwise. It is proved in [1] that (i) Graph G is perfect if and only if its EFF E G is balanced and (ii) Graph G is kernel-solvable if and only if its EFF E G is stable.
We refer to [1] for the definitions. Thus, whether the graph G is perfect (respectively, kernel-solvable) or not depends only on its effectivity function E G .
In is known in cooperative game theory that balanced EFFs are stable. Hence, perfect graphs are kernel-solvable. This was conjectured by Claude Berge and Pierre Duchet in 1983. The inverse implication follows from the Strong Berge Perfect Graph Conjecture that was recently proved by Chudnovsky, Robertson, Seymour, and Thomas [2] .
